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JOHN N. TOGNINO:
Judge Dufly will examine the use of arbitration in resolving customer complaints
in the securities industry. The role of the federal courts in securities arbitration have
diminished since the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of arbitration clauses in
securities agreements.' Judge Duffy will also propose changes to the arbitration system
that will increase the role of the courts.
JUDGE KEVIN THOMAS DUFFY:2
Ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to address an outstanding group of industry
leaders. In 1990, I had the opportunity to present my views on dispute arbitration to a
securities industry group. I stated then that the advantages of arbitration were its
informal nature, its limited discovery, its lack of binding precedents, and its lack of an
appeal process. I also, however, stated that these same aspects were also the
1 See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez
De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989); see also
Rescission of Rule Governing Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses in Broker-Dealer
Customer Agreements, 52 Fed. Reg. 39,216, 39,217 (1987) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
240.15c2-2) (proposed Oct. 21, 1987) (rescinding Rule 15c2-2 of the Exchange Act of
1934, which deemed failure to disclose inapplicability of such clauses to federal
securities claims to be a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act" within the meaning of
the Exchange Act).
2 Federal District Judge in the Southern District of New York: B.A., 1954, Fordham
College; LL.B., 1958, Fordham University School of Law; Associate, Whitman, Ravison
& Coulson, New York, N.Y. (1961-1966); Partner, Gordon & Gordon, New York, N.Y.
(1966-1969); Regional Administrator ofthe SEC, New York Regional office (1969-71).
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disadvantages of arbitration. 3 I noted that arbitration was intended to be a quicker and
cheaper method of dispute resolution as compared to formal litigation.4 Today, I will
critically examine the securities industry arbitration process and propose a government
alternative.
I. INFORMALITY INARBITRATION
Over the last eight years formality has crept into the arbitration process. A
number of self-regulatory organizations have developed detailed rules and handbooks to
regulate the arbitration process.5 Formal mediation is now generally undertaken at the
commencement of the arbitration process. Moreover, there is now a formal bar
association that specializes in investor arbitration.
6
3 See Matthew Press, Arbitration of Claims Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934: Is Exclusive Jurisdiction Still Justified?, 77 B.U. L. REv. 629, 650-53 (1997)
(discussing disadvantages of securities arbitration such as, inter alia, lack of procedural
protections, lack of uniform standards on which to base awards, and inhibition of the
development of federal law based on specific factual disputes).
4 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985) (stating that a party agreeing to arbitration "trades the procedures and opportunity
for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of
arbitration."); But see Jean R. Stermlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the
Supreme Court's preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 672-73
(1996) (criticizing the "myth" enunciated in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. "that arbitration is
as appropriate for virtually all disputes as is litigation").
5 See, e.g., Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The First Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 483, 488-90 (1996) (discussing the role of self-regulatory organizations in
developing the Uniform Code of Arbitration as a means of harmonizing their separate
rules).
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II. LIMITED DISCOVERY
Eight years ago arbitration discovery was limited. Claimants in securities
arbitration are now entitled to document discovery from brokerage firms. 7 Discoverable
documents include client account histories, broker-dealer research on disputed securities,
individual broker personnel files, compliance manuals and as many more documents as
the arbitrator will allow.
8
III. LACK OF BINDING PRECEDENT
Arbitration awards are easy to research but have limited value. The National
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") will provide a list of an arbitrator's recent
awards in any NASD sponsored arbitration. 9 The Securities Arbitration Commentator
will provide complete background on all awards ever granted by a specific arbitrator,'
0
This information is of limited value because there are no formal opinions and the awards,
do not have the effect of binding precedent." Thus, claimants have received awards
6 Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association. See Quinn, Investor Taking
Stockbroker to Arbitration Doesn't Stand a Chance Without Lawyer's Help, BUFFALO
NEws, May 14, 1997, at B9.
7 UNIF. CODE OF ARBITRATION §20 (1996); But see Press, supra note 3, at 652
("[T]hough arbitrators have some power to compel discovery, it is limited by local statute
and may in some cases be insufficient to compel the production of important documents
or testimony from distant jurisdictions.") (citation omitted).
s See Quinn, supra note 6, at B9 (recommending documents that investors should
obtain to prepare for securities arbitration).
9 See id.
10 See id.
1 See Press, supra note 3, at 643.
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simply because they have lost money or have suffered some other harm.1 2 Substantial
punitive damages were awarded against a broker-dealer that intentionally failed to
produce discovery documents. 13
IV. LACK OFANAPPEAL PROCESS
Without fear of reversal on appeal, securities arbitrators decide cases without
referring to precedent. 4 Arbitrators often do not have any knowledge of the industry, the
securities laws, and the applicable basis of liability.15 There are no formal rules to follow
in deciding claims. It may be that fewer rules are necessary for the arbitration process to
reach a quick resolution. Obviously, an appeal process would delay claim resolution.
V. QUICKRESOLUTIONS
Arbitration claims, during this bull market, will be heard within 10 months. In a
bear market, claims will increase and the speed of resolution will decline. In contrast, the
federal courts system handles simple cases within a two-year period. The current relative
speed of arbitration resolution is of questionable advantage. Originally, the securities
industry assumed that arbitrators would know enough about the industry to render quick
12 See id. at 651 (noting that "arbitrators may decide awards on a purely equitable basis"
and are "free to award what they feel the circumstances of the case require").
13 Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 948 F.2d 117, (2d Cir. 1991).
14 See Perry E. Wallace, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, Rodriguez, and the
New Rules: Can Investors' Rights Really be Protected?, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1199, 1248
(1990) (noting that arbitration process does not involve strict application of legal
principles or substantial legal research).
See Shelly R. James, Arbitration in the Securities Field: Does the Present System of
Arbitration Between Small Investors and Brokerage Firms Really Protect Anyone?, 21 J.
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resolutions.'6 The speed of resolution is now regarded as the result of a lack of industry
knowledge on the part of arbitrators.
VI. LOWER COST
A recent Wall Street Journal article suggested that arbitration is not a low cost
alternative to formal litigation. 17 The cost of the arbitration may be $400 or more, while
the filing fee in federal district court is $120. Moreover, the increased use of discovery
will only increase the aggregate amount of legal fees incurred in the arbitration process as
a whole. Thus, the cost savings benefit of arbitration is eroding.
VII. PROPOSAL
The claims of securities industry customers should return to the federal courts.
Arbitration is not a mandatory solution to resolving customer complaints. The security
industry arbitration process is really a court specializing in reviewing customer
complaints. The securities laws should be amended to provide for an administrative
tribunal to hear customer claims. This tribunal would issue written opinions, follow
precedent, and be subject to an appeal process. Moreover, punitive damages could be
CORP. L. 363, 385 (1996) (noting that "public arbitrators" required to hear claims under
NASD rules are not necessarily from the securities field).
16 See id.
17 See Deborah Lohse, Investors' Arbitration Costs Are Increasing, WALL ST. J., June
30, 1997, at C1.
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eliminated and punishment could be directed against an individual broker rather than the
entire broker-dealer firm.18
There are other administrative tribunals within the federal court system. The
Securities and Exchange Commission has administrative tribunals. The Social Security
system utilizes such tribunals. Bankruptcy courts are in fact administrative tribunals with
Article I Judges. In fact, Bankruptcy Courts constitute a unit of the district court and
receives its authority from the district courts in which it sits. This same concept could be
applied to an administrative tribunal authorized to hear the complaints of securities
customers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It has been said that arbitration is only successful when both sides trust the
arbitrator's decision. The securities industry and the investing public are unhappy with
the arbitration process. This suggests that the arbitration process must be fixed. I
recommend fixing the process while the market is bullish and customer claims are low.
18 See Katsoris, supra, note 5, at 518 (noting the likelihood of appeal on an award for
punitive damages due to its unusual nature).
